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Abstract
Credit unions differ in the types of financial services they offer to their members. This paper
explicitly models this observed heterogeneity using a generalized model of endogenous ordered
switching. Our approach captures the endogenous choice that credit unions make when adding
new products to their financial services mix. Failure to do so is likely to yield biased and incon-
sistent estimates. The model that we develop also allows for the dependence between unobserved
effects and regressors in both the selection and outcome equations and can accommodate the
presence of predetermined covariates in the model. We use this model to estimate returns to
scale for U.S. retail credit unions from 1996 to 2011. We document strong evidence of persistent
technological heterogeneity among credit unions offering different financial service mixes, which,
if ignored, can produce quite misleading results. Employing our generalized model, we find that
credit unions of all types exhibit substantial economies of scale.
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‘All happy families are alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.’
Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina.
1 Introduction
U.S. credit unions continue to prosper despite the decline in their relative advantages over com-
mercial banks. Factors such as increasing availability of credit information from national credit-
reporting bureaus, establishment of the federal deposit insurance fund for credit unions and the
growth in credit card lending by larger financial institutions have significantly eroded conventional
benefits of doing business at the local, small-scale level (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Walter, 2006;
Wheelock and Wilson, 2011). This has motivated credit unions to evolve.
With the authorization to issue long-term mortgage loans in 1977 and the passage of the Credit
Union Membership Access Act of 1998 which empowered them to widen and diversify their mem-
bership scope, credit unions have grown significantly in an attempt to compensate for the loss of
traditional competitive advantages by capitalizing on economies of scale. Over the past decade, the
average size of (federally-insured) credit unions has increased from $57.5 million to $135.8 million
in assets. As of the end of 2011, the industry accounted for about a trillion dollars in assets and
more than 92 million members (authors’ calculations based on NCUA, 2011).
Several studies have investigated the performance of U.S. credit unions.1 However, to our
knowledge, no attempt has been made to formally model credit unions’ technologies taking into
consideration their differing output mixes (that is, different financial service menus they offer to
their members). This limits our understanding of the industry structure, its evolution and the
potential impact of alternative policies.
All previous studies have encountered the same problem, namely, the presence of a large number
of observations for which the reported values of credit unions’ outputs are zeros. This issue has been
handled either by linearly aggregating different types of outputs into larger bundles (Fried et al.,
1999; Frame and Coelli, 2001; Wheelock and Wilson, 2011, 2013) or by replacing zero outputs
with an arbitrary small positive number (Frame et al., 2003). These methods may however be
inappropriate since they do not recognize that the existence of zero-value outputs provides valuable
information regarding the choice of the production technology by credit unions.
[insert Table 1 here]
To preview the importance of modeling the choice of credit unions’ technology (which we discuss
in detail in Section 2), consider Table 1 which presents the number of retail credit unions in each
year between 1994 and 2011 with zero values reported for some (or all) of the four outputs commonly
considered in the literature. All credit unions2 report non-zero values for consumer loans (y3) which
historically have been the main product of credit unions. However, there is a strikingly large number
of credit unions that offer no real estate (y1) or business loans (y2) to their members throughout
the years we consider. This evidence favors our view that not all credit unions are alike. Given that
the output mix differs across units and over time, a substantial time-persistent heterogeneity may
exist among credit unions.
We view this observed heterogeneity as an outcome of an endogenous choice made by credit
union managers. They decide what range of services to offer to their members and choose the
appropriate technology to provide them. Thus, it is likely that the production technology which a
credit union employs varies with its output mix. To our knowledge, this technological heterogeneity
1See Wheelock and Wilson (2011, 2013) and the references therein.
2With the exception of a single entity.
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(defined by the output mix) has been either assumed to be exogenous and/or completely taken for
granted in all previous studies. The aggregation of outputs into broader categories to solve the
zero-output problem, so often practiced in the literature, constitutes the loss of information in both
econometric and economic senses. The results previously reported in the literature are therefore
likely to be misleading since the used econometric models ignore the time-persistent heterogeneity
arising from the endogenous selection of credit unions’ technologies.3
Heterogeneity among credit unions is unlikely to be limited to the technology they use; each
credit union is unique in its operations. Ignoring this unobserved heterogeneity when estimating
credit unions’ technology (which is customary in the existing literature4) may produce inconsistent
estimates since unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with covariates present in the
estimated equation. While such credit-union-specific unobserved effects cannot be accounted for in
a cross-sectional setting due to the incidental parameters problem, we address this issue in our case
by taking advantage of the panel structure of the data.
In this paper, we address the above concerns by developing a unified framework that allows
the estimation of credit union technologies that is robust to (i) misspecification due to an a priori
assumption of homogeneous technology, (ii) selectivity bias due to ignoring the endogeneity in
technology selection, and (iii) endogeneity (omitted variable) bias due to the failure to account for
unobserved union-specific effects that are correlated with covariates in the estimated equations.
The estimation of such a model is not trivial. As we demonstrate in Section 2, the data indicate
that 99% of all U.S. retail credit unions employ one of the three technologies associated with different
output mixes offered by these institutions. These technologies have an ordered relationship. The
existing literature on panel data selection models with unobserved heterogeneity focuses mainly on
binary selection, and few papers allow for dependence between unobserved effects and covariates
in both the outcome and the selection equations (see the references in Section 3). Among those
studies that do allow for the latter, most rely on the assumption of strict exogeneity of covariates
throughout the entire model (e.g., Wooldridge, 1995; Kyriazidou, 1997, 2001; Rochina-Barrachina,
1999) or at least in the selection equation (e.g., Vella and Verbeek, 1999; Charlier et al., 2001;
Lee and Vella, 2006; Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010) which is particularly hard to justify in our
application.
Gayle and Viauroux (2007) study a dynamic panel data sample selection model quite similar
to ours, where both the outcome and selection equations are permitted to contain predetermined
variables as well as unobserved effects. However, to identify their model they require the presence
of some strictly exogenous time-invariant variables in the selection equation. This assumption is
however too restrictive for our application and is unlikely to be supported by the data. In a related
3We acknowledge that the issue of heterogeneity among credit unions has been also addressed (although from a
somewhat different perspective) in Wheelock and Wilson (2011) who estimate credit unions’ cost function via kernel
methods, thus avoiding any functional specification for the underlying technology and obtaining observation-specific
estimates of the cost function. A kernel regression indeed permits credit unions’ technologies to be completely
heterogeneous with respect to covariates included in the regression. However, the aggregation of all types of loans
into a single output, which Wheelock and Wilson (2011) resort to, does not allow them to account for the heterogeneity
resulting from differing output mixes which this paper emphasizes. The authors do include two indicator variables
in their regressions to control for zero-value (disaggregated) outputs. While the latter partly resolves the issue, the
information on output-type-specific variation is still being lost which is likely to affect the results on scale economies
reported in the paper. More importantly, similar to the rest of the literature, Wheelock and Wilson (2011) do not
consider a likely possibility of differing output mixes being endogenously determined by credit unions which, as we
show in this paper among other things, may result in severely distorted results due to the unaddressed selectivity bias.
That is, the above-mentioned indicator variables used by Wheelock and Wilson (2011) are likely to be endogenous.
4To our knowledge, Frame et al. (2003) is the only study which attempts to estimate (homogeneous) credit unions’
technology using panel data while allowing for unobserved heterogeneity among institutions. However, the latter is
modeled as random effects under a strong assumption of its exogeneity which is unlikely to be supported by the data.
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study, Arellano and Carrasco (2003) study a single-equation binary choice dynamic panel data model
with predetermined covariates and unobserved effects that are allowed to be correlated with the
explanatory variables, which is similar to our technology selection equation. Given our empirical
application, we propose a model of ordered selection, conditional on predetermined covariates,
that allows for correlated unobserved effects in both the selection and outcome equations. To our
knowledge, no such model has been considered in the literature.
We contribute to the literature by (i) extending Wooldridge’s (1995) estimator in the spirit of
Arellano and Carrasco (2003) to the case of ordered selection and the presence of predetermined
covariates in the model and (ii) applying this framework to estimate the returns to scale for all
U.S. retail credit unions in 1996-2011. The latter has been recently brought into the spotlight
of scholarly discourse (Emmons and Schmid, 1999; Wilcox, 2005, 2006; Wheelock and Wilson,
2011). We compare our estimates to those (potentially biased and inconsistent) obtained by ignoring
heterogeneity due to endogenous technology selection and unobserved effects.
We find that not all U.S. retail credit unions are alike. There is evidence of persistent technolog-
ical heterogeneity among credit unions offering different financial service mixes. We consistently fail
to reject the null hypotheses of exogenous technology selection and homogeneous (common) technol-
ogy among credit unions. We further find that ignoring this observed heterogeneity and unobserved
time-invariant effects across credit unions leads to downward biases in returns to scale estimates. In
particular, models that do not account for parameter heterogeneity, endogenous switching and/or
dependence between unobserved effects and right-hand-side covariates can produce the misleading
finding that 6 to 20% of credit unions offering all types of loans suffer from diseconomies of scale
and are thus scale-inefficient. This result broadly vanishes when we address all the concerns we raise
in this paper. Consistent with Wheelock and Wilson (2011), we find that most credit unions (of all
technology types) exhibit substantial economies of scale. Hence, the growth of the industry is far
from reaching its peak. The industry-wide trends such as the diversification of financial services of-
fered to members as well as mergers among credit unions are likely to persist over coming years. We
therefore expect a policy debate over credit unions’ tax-exempt status and their special regulatory
treatment compared with commercial banks to reignite in the near future. As these institutions
grow in size and complexity, they may become of systemic importance. Regulators should be aware
of these trends to contain threats that credit unions may potentially pose for local and national
economies.
We also note that our generalized model is not tailored to the analysis of credit unions only. The
framework can be applied to any other panel data study where selectivity and both observed and
unobserved heterogeneity are present. Some examples would be studies of electric or water utilities,
which often include both specialized and integrated companies that operate under non-homogeneous
production technologies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data as well as a
discussion of how we identify heterogeneous credit union technologies. We describe our generalized
econometric model in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Heterogeneous Technologies
2.1 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we define the framework in which we study credit union technologies. Due to
their cooperative nature, credit unions are not profit-maximizers. Instead, they are thought of as
maximizing service provision to their members in terms of quantity, price and variety of services
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(Smith, 1984; Fried et al., 1999). Following a wide practice in the literature (Frame and Coelli, 2001;
Frame et al., 2003; Wheelock and Wilson, 2011, 2013), we adopt a “service provision approach”
under which, given their production technologies,5 credit unions minimize variable, non-interest
cost subject to the levels and types of outputs, the competitive prices of variable inputs and the
levels of quasi-fixed netputs.
We consider the following four outputs: real estate loans (y1), business and agricultural loans
(y2), consumer loans (y3) and investments (y4). We further follow Frame et al. (2003) and Whee-
lock and Wilson (2011, 2013) and include two quasi-fixed netputs (services) to capture the price
dimension of the service provision by credit unions: the average interest rate on saving deposits (y˜5)
and the average interest rate on loans (y˜6). The variable input prices that enter the credit union
cost are the price of capital (w1) and the price of labor (w2). To partially account for the riskiness
of the credit union operations, we also include equity capital (k˜) as a quasi-fixed input in the cost
function, as usually done in the banking literature. Credit unions studies have broadly ignored the
latter under the implicit assumption of risk-neutral behavior of credit union managers. Including
equity capital is also appropriate if one considers it as an additional input to the production of loans
(see Hughes and Mester, 1998, 2013; Hughes et al., 1996, among many others). These variables are
taken as arguments of the dual variable, non-interest cost function of a credit union, defined as
C
(
y, y˜,w, k˜
)
= min
x
{
x′w | T
(
y, y˜,x, k˜
)
≤ 1; y˜ = y˜0; k˜ = k˜0
}
, (2.1)
where y = (y1, y2, y3, y4) is a vector of outputs, y˜ = (y˜5, y˜6) is a vector of quasi-fixed netputs with
the corresponding vector of observed (fixed) values y˜0; w = (w1, w2) is a vector of the variable
input prices; x = (x1, x2) is a vector of variable inputs; k˜ is a quasi-fixed input with the observed
(fixed) value k˜0; and T (·) is the transformation function.
Compared to a primal specification of the production process, the dual cost approach is advan-
tageous mainly because it avoids the use of input quantities which can lead to simultaneity problems
given that the allocation of variable inputs is endogenous to a credit union manager’s decisions. We
thus treat the cost function covariates as strictly exogenous, as justified theoretically by the cost
minimization premise and widely accepted in the financial services literature [e.g., see Hughes and
Mester (forthcoming) for an excellent review].
The data we use in this study come from year-end call reports available from the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), a federal regulatory body that supervises credit unions. The
available data cover all state and federally chartered U.S. credit unions over the period from 1994 to
2011. We discard observations with negative values of outputs and total cost. Likewise, we exclude
observations with non-positive values of variable input prices, quasi-fixed netputs, equity capital,
total assets, reserves and total liabilities. Since y˜ and w1 are interest rates, we follow Wheelock and
Wilson (2011) and also eliminate those observations for which values of these variables lie outside
the unit interval. These excluded observations are likely to be the result of erroneous data reporting.
For the details on construction of the variables from the call reports, see the Appendix.
In this paper we focus on retail, or so-called natural-person, credit unions only. We therefore
exclude corporate credit unions (whose customers are the retail credit unions) from the sample to
minimize noise in the data due to apparent non-homogeneity between these two types of depositories
(this results in a loss of less than 0.7% of observations in the sample). Our data sample thus consists
of 151,817 year-observations for all retail state and federally chartered credit unions over 1994-2011.
5That is, given the mix of financial services (outputs) that credit unions opt to provide to their members.
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2.2 Heterogeneous Technologies
We next proceed to the identification of heterogeneous technologies among credit unions. As pointed
out in the Introduction, the data indicate the presence of significant differences among credit unions
in terms of the mix of services they offer to members. Based on the tabulation of zero-value
observations reported in Table 1, on average, we find that 88% of credit unions in our sample do
not offer business loans (y2) and 31% do not offer mortgage loans (y1) in a given year. Ignoring
this observed heterogeneity in the provision of services across credit unions amounts to making a
strong assumption that all credit unions share the same technology that is invariant to the range of
services they provide. This assumption is unlikely to hold since credit unions endogenously choose
their output mixes.
[insert Table 2 here]
Given the four types of loans we consider, we can identify 15 possible credit union technolo-
gies associated with unique output mixes. The possible heterogeneous technologies are those of
the credit unions specialized in one (complete specialization), two or three types of loans (partial
specialization) and of the unions that produce all four outputs (no specialization). Table 2 presents
a summary of these technologies corresponding to output mixes constructed based on the non-zero-
value loans reported by credit unions. The table shows that the majority of credit unions falls into
the following three categories: (i) those that provide consumer loans and investments y1 ≡ (y3, y4);
(ii) those that provide real estate and consumer loans as well as investments y2 ≡ (y1, y3, y4);
and (iii) those that provide all types of outputs: real estate, business and consumer loans, and
investments y3 ≡ (y1, y2, y3, y4). Together, the three groups of credit unions constitute 99% of all
observations in the sample, suggesting that the remaining one percent likely contains either outliers
or reporting errors. We omit them from our analysis from this point forward. We label the three
above output mixes as “1”, “2” and “3”, respectively, and define their corresponding technologies as
“Technology 1”, “Technology 2” and “Technology 3”. We hereafter use technology and output mix
types interchangeably when referring to credit unions. Also note that the three technology types
are not independent but rather nested with a distinct ordering: a switch from Technology 1 (2) to
Technology 2 (3) implies offering an extra output y1 (y2).6
[insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of credit unions in our sample by the technology type. This figure
indicates several trends. First, there is an apparent secular decline in the number of credit unions
over time, mainly due to mergers and acquisitions. Second, the heterogeneity among U.S. credit
unions (as captured by the technology type) is highly persistent over time. While today most credit
unions still operate under Technology 2 as they did back in 1994, the presence of other technology
types has increased over recent years. Third, there is a trend among credit unions to shift away
from Technology 1 to Technology 2 and even more so to Technology 3 over time (as confirmed by
an unreported analysis of technology transitions).
[insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the dual cost function as well as
several other variables descriptive of the characteristics of credit unions such as total assets, reserves,
etc. All nominal stock variables are deflated to 2011 U.S. dollars using the GDP Implicit Price
Deflator. A comparison of sample mean and median estimates of variables shows clear differences
among credit union technologies. As expected, the size of the credit unions (proxied either by total
6In Section 3, we therefore model technology types as ordered alternatives.
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assets, reserves or the number of members) increases as one moves from Technology 1 to Technology
3. This is also apparent in Figure 2 which plots kernel density estimates for the log of total assets
tabulated by technology types. The large differences between technology types favor our view that
the assumption of homogeneous (common) technology across credit unions is likely to result in the
loss of information and the misspecification of the econometric model. As we show in Section 4,
this produces biased estimates and potentially misleading results.
[insert Figure 2 here]
2.3 A Generalized Framework
We model the production technology for each of the three identified types of credit unions separately.
We explicitly recognize that, under the abovementioned “service provision approach”, credit unions
minimize non-interest, variable cost subject to different types of outputs among other relevant
constraints. Consequently, the associated production technologies are allowed to be heterogeneous
over credit union types. That is, we consider the following generalization of the dual cost function
(2.1)
Cs
(
ys, y˜,w, k˜
)
= min
x
{
x′w | Ts
(
ys, y˜,x, k˜
)
≤ 1; y˜ = y˜0; k˜ = k˜0
}
, s = 1, 2, 3 (2.2)
where the output vector and the associated transformation and cost functions are indexed by one
of the three types of credit unions s which we have identified above. Note that, unlike the model
of homogeneous technology (2.1), the generalized model (2.2) does not suffer from the problem of
having to deal with zero-value outputs.
Further, the above technological heterogeneity is likely to be an outcome of an endogenous
choice made by credit unions. Based on the set of relevant demand and supply factors, credit
union managers decide what range of financial services to offer to their members and choose the
appropriate technology to provide them at the minimum cost. As seen above, the data particularly
suggest considering covariates that correlate with the size of a credit union such as its total assets
and other variables reflecting the credit union’s financial strength and potential for growth and
diversification. After carefully examining the existing literature for potential candidates, we settle
on the following set of variables (z): total assets, reserves, leverage ratio,7 the number of current
and potential members, indicator variables for federally accredited, state accredited and federally
insured,8 and multiple-bond credit unions. Table 3 provides their summary statistics.
We use the total value of assets and the number of current members of the credit union to capture
the size of credit unions (Goddard et al., 2002). One can naturally expect a larger credit union
to seek the diversification of its output mix and thus switch to a less specialized technology. We
proxy the credit union’s potential for growth using the reported level of reserves (Bauer, 2008; Bauer
et al., 2009) and the size of the field of membership, i.e., the number of potential members (Goddard
et al., 2008). The intuition here is as follows. The larger a credit union’s field of membership is, the
more likely it is to consider offering a wider range of services to its members and thus changing its
technology. A larger membership field is likely to generate the demand for a more diverse menu of
financial services. Similarly, the leverage ratio controls for the level of financial constraint a credit
union may be subject to, which can directly influence its growth and the scope of services it offers.
We also condition the choice of technology on whether a credit union can draw its members from a
pool of people with single or multiple associations. This is crucial since multiple-bond credit unions
7Defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets.
8While all federally accredited unions are insured, the same however cannot be said about all state accredited unions.
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have a substantial advantage over single-bond ones due to their ability to grow in size and diversify
credit risks more easily (Walter, 2006). For instance, a single-bond credit union that is authorized
to draw its members from a pool of employees of a single plant only is susceptible to any economic
shock that this plant it subject to. Dummies for federally and state accredited credit unions are
used to control for possible intrinsic differences between the two types of entities.
Unlike the cost function covariates, treating the above variables z as exogenous may however
be invalid. While a larger credit union is able to offer a wider range of services to its members,
the reverse may hold too: a more diversified credit union has a bigger capacity to grow. To avoid
such an endogeneity problem when modeling technology selection, we conceptualize the output mix
selection by credit unions as a lagged process. That is, we assume that a credit union considers its
current position in terms of size, financial health, etc. as well as the service mix it currently offers
to its members when making a decision about the composition of the mix for the next year. This
seems reasonable given that a change in a credit union’s service offerings is hardly an overnight
venture but likely requires considerable time for activities like business planning and analysis, staff
training, advertising, etc. Econometrically, the above assumption is equivalent to requiring that the
lagged values of z be predetermined.
3 A Generalized Econometric Model
This section develops an econometric model that we employ to investigate underlying differences
in heterogeneous technologies across U.S. credit unions. The model (i) avoids imposing a strong
assumption of homogeneous technology uniformly adopted by all credit unions irrespective of the
service mix they offer to their members; (ii) explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of the selection
of these different technologies by unions over the course of time; and (iii) allows for unobserved time-
invariant correlated effects amongst credit unions. Before we proceed, we note that the notation
used in this section has no connection to that in previous sections, unless specified otherwise.
Consider a dual cost function of an s-type credit union i in period t:
Cs,it =
{
x′s,itβs + αs,i + us,it if Tit = s
− otherwise (3.1a)
T ∗it = ρtTit−1 + z
′
it−1γt + ξi + eit , (i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , tmax; s = 1, . . . , S) (3.1b)
where Cs,it is the total variable, non-interest cost; and xs,it is a Ks × 1 vector of strictly exogenous
relevant cost function covariates as defined in Section 2 (including unity for the intercept), with the
corresponding parameter vector βs of conformable dimension.
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Cs,it is observed only if the sth technology is selected, i.e., if Tit = s. T
∗
it is a latent variable
governing the technology selection by a credit union i in period t, given the technology selected in
the previous period Tit−1 and an L× 1 vector of some relevant lagged variables zit−1. We condition
the technology selection in period t on the lagged technology Tit−1 in order to allow for the state
dependence of technology types over time. That is, a credit union naturally considers the financial
services mix it currently offers to its members when making a decision about the composition of
the mix for the next period. Further, we postulate the selection equation (3.1b) as a function
of the lagged z variables in order to avoid making a strong assumption of contemporaneous or
9In this paper, we consider the widely used translog cost function. Thus, to be exact, the left-hand-side variable will
be the log of the total variable, non-interest cost, and the vector xs,it will include the translog terms of the cost
function covariates
(
ys, y˜,w, k˜
)
. For more details, see Section 4.
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strict exogeneity of z which is unlikely to be supported by the data. Instead, we make a milder
assumption of the predeterminedness of zit−1, as discussed in Section 2. Parameter vector (ρt,γt)
is time-varying which allows for unrestricted temporal dynamics of eit. Lastly, (αs,i, ξi) are time-
invariant, credit-union-specific unobserved effects. The subscript s denotes the technology type.
Given the ordered nature of the technology types defined in Section 2, it is natural to think of
the latent variable T ∗it as measuring a credit union’s propensity to select a more complex (diverse)
output mix. The technology s is selected if and only if
Tit = s ⇔ µs−1,t < T ∗it ≤ µs,t , (3.2)
where µs,t ∈ {µ0,t, . . . , µS,t} is a time-varying threshold.
Define xs,i ≡ (xs,i1, . . . ,xs,itmax), wit ≡ (Tit, zit) and wti ≡ (wi1, . . . ,wit). While we assume that
the error terms us,it and eit are orthogonal to xs,i and w
t−1
i , their distributions are however allowed
to be correlated, namely E
[
us,iteit
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i ] 6= 0. Note that the above model is a generalization
of a standard endogenous switching regression model (Maddala, 1983, p.223) to a case of ordered
choice with the assumption of strict exogeneity of covariates in the selection equation being relaxed
to weak exogeneity.
The estimation of generalized model (3.1) is not trivial. While there has been a great interest
in extending traditional limited dependent variable models to the case of panel data which permits
controlling for unobserved effects,10 the literature on such models incorporated into linear regressions
with selectivity mainly focuses on binary selection (for a comprehensive review, see Baltagi, 2013).
These panel data selection models differ in their assumptions about the form of the unobserved
heterogeneity in outcome and selection equations: whether (exogenous) random effects are assumed
in both equations (e.g., Hausman and Wise, 1979; Ridder, 1990, 1992; Verbeek and Nijman, 1996)
or in the selection equation only (e.g., Verbeek, 1990). Few attempts have been made to allow for
unobserved effects that correlate with right-hand-side covariates in both the outcome and selection
equations. In the case of strictly exogenous covariates, some approaches to tackle such effects in
panel sample selection models (Type 2 Tobit11) are those of Wooldridge (1995), Kyriazidou (1997)
and Rochina-Barrachina (1999). Honore´ et al. (2000) extend Kyriazidou’s (1997) estimator to all
types of Tobit, whereas Kyriazidou (2001) generalizes her estimator for a dynamic panel. For a
concise comparison of these estimators, see Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007).
Nonetheless, the above methods are not applicable in our case, since the selection equation (3.1b)
contains predetermined covariates.12 Gayle and Viauroux (2007) propose a three-stage semipara-
metric sieve estimator of a dynamic panel data sample selection model quite similar to ours in (3.1),
where both the outcome and binary selection equations are permitted to contain predetermined vari-
ables as well as unobserved effects. However, one of the key restrictions needed to identify Gayle
and Viauroux’s (2007) model is the assumption that unobserved effects in the selection equation
are correlated with a strictly exogenous time-invariant component of zit−1 only (in our notation).
The latter assumption is however too restrictive for our application and is unlikely to be supported
by the data, as discussed in Section 2. On the other hand, Arellano and Carrasco (2003) study a
binary choice (dynamic) panel data model with predetermined covariates and unobserved effects
that are allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables, which is similar to our selection
equation (3.1b).13
10E.g., Manski (1987), Avery et al. (1983), Honore´ and Kyriazidou (2000), Magnac (2000, 2004) among many others.
11Amemiya’s (1985) terminology.
12Other similar panel data selection models relax strict exogeneity of covariates in the outcome equation (e.g., Vella
and Verbeek, 1999; Charlier et al., 2001; Lee and Vella, 2006; Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010).
13The differences are: (i) we allow parameters to be time-varying and (ii) our selection process is not binary but
ordered.
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Given the research question that we posit in this paper, we consider a model of ordered choice,
conditional on predetermined covariates, that allows for correlated unobserved effects in both the
selection and outcome equations. To our knowledge, no such model has been considered in the
literature. We thus fill this void by extending Wooldridge’s (1995) estimator in the spirit of Arellano
and Carrasco (2003) to the case of ordered selection and the presence of predetermined covariates
in the model.
We first formalize the selection equation (3.1b), where we build upon Arellano and Carrasco’s
(2003) setup.
Assumption 1. For i = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , tmax and s = 1, . . . , S:
(i) The conditional mean of the unobserved effects in the selection equation is a linear projec-
tion on wt−1i , i.e.,
ξi = L
[
ξi
∣∣wt−1i ]+ ci (3.3a)
E
[
ci
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i ] = 0 , (3.3b)
where L[·] denotes the linear projection operator.
(ii) The composite error it ≡ eit + ci is i.i.d. normally distributed over i given (xs,i,wt−1i ):
it
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i ∼ N (0, σ2t ) . (3.3c)
Thus, our model allows for dependence between unobserved effects ξi and right-hand-side covariates
wit−1. Assumption 1 is slightly more restrictive than that in Arellano and Carrasco (2003, p.127)
which we tighten by assuming the linearity of the conditional mean. In the latter respect, our
approach is more close to that pursued by Arellano et al. (1999) who also model unobserved effects
as a linear projection on the history of the predetermined covariates in their model. The benefit
of assuming a linear conditional mean of ξi is that it allows us to dispense with a nonparametric
estimation (via kernel methods) of conditional probabilities Pr
[
Tit = s
∣∣wt−1i ], which one needs
to do if following Arellano and Carrasco’s (2003) approach. We seek to avoid a nonparametric
estimation of the above probabilities primarily due to an acute “curse of dimensionality” problem
associated with it which arises in our application given the high dimensionality of wt−1i .
14
Specifically, we let the linear projection L
[
ξi
∣∣wt−1i ] in (3.3a) take the following form a` la
Mundlak (1978)
L
[
ξi
∣∣wt−1i ] = wt−1i ′ηt , (3.4)
where wt−1i ≡
∑(t−1)
τ=1 wiτ and ηt is an (L + 1) × 1 parameter vector. This is a quite popular
parameterization of correlated effects in the literature (e.g., Nijman and Verbeek, 1992; Semyk-
ina and Wooldridge, 2010). Alternatively, one can choose a less restrictive Chamberlain’s (1980)
specification L
[
ξi
∣∣wt−1i ] = wt−1i ′δt which, for instance, underlines the selection process specified
in Wooldridge (1995). Here, we opt for (3.4) due to its parsimony and relative computational
simplicity.15
Under Assumption 1, the selection equation is given by
T ∗it = ρtTit−1 + z
′
it−1γt + w
t−1
i
′ηt + it (3.5)
14Especially, when t approaches tmax.
15In particular, Chamberlain’s (1980) specification would require estimation of [(L+1)t+(S−1)] parameters for each
time period t. Due to high nonlinearity of the objective function and a relatively large t in our application, the true
values of the parameters in (3.1a) may thus not be easy to locate.
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with the associated conditional probability of selecting the sth technology [in line with (3.2)]
Pr
[
Tit = s
∣∣wt−1i ] = Φ
(
µs,t − ρtTit−1 − z′it−1γt −wt−1i ′ηt
σt
)
−
Φ
(
µs−1,t − ρtTit−1 − z′it−1γt −wt−1i ′ηt
σt
)
, (3.6)
where Φ(·) denotes a standard normal cdf.
Next, we formalize the treatment of unobserved effects in the outcome equation as well as the
dependence between the two disturbances in (3.1a) and (3.5), where the latter enables us to correct
for selection bias in the outcome equation.
Assumption 2. For i = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , tmax and s = 1, . . . , S:
(i) The conditional mean of the unobserved effects in the outcome equation s is a linear
projection on (xs,i,w
t−1
i , it), i.e.,
E
[
αs,i
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] = L [αs,i ∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] . (3.7a)
(ii) The error term us,it is mean independent of (xs,i,w
t−1
i ) conditional on it and is linear in
it, i.e.,
E
[
us,it
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] = E [us,it |it ] = L [us,it |it ] . (3.7b)
In particular, when modeling correlated effects in the outcome equation (3.1a), we consider the
following general form of (3.7a) along the lines of Wooldridge (1995)
L
[
αs,i
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] = x′s,i1ϕs,t1 + · · ·+ x′s,itmaxϕs,ttmax+
w′i1ωs,t1 + · · ·+ w′it−1ωs,t(t−1) + ψs,tit . (3.8)
Using the law of iterated expectations, one can easily show that, under our assumptions, the pa-
rameters on xs,it in (3.8) are necessarily constant over t.
16 Thus, (3.8) simplifies to
L
[
αs,i
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] = x′s,i1ϕs,1 + · · ·+ x′s,itmaxϕs,tmax+
w′i1ωs,t1 + · · ·+ w′it−1ωs,t(t−1) + ψs,tit
= x′s,iϕs + w
t−1
i
′ωs,t + ψs,tit , (3.9)
where ϕs, ωs,t and ψs,t areKstmax×1, (L+1)(t−1)×1 parameter vectors and a scalar, respectively.17
Note that this treatment of unobserved effects is in the spirit of Chamberlain (1980).
In Assumption 2(ii), the mean independence of us,it in (3.7b) follows from the assumption
of strict exogeneity of xs,it and predeterminedness of wit−1 (as discussed in Section 2). Unlike
Wooldridge (1995), we also condition the expectation of us,it on w
t−1
i . This is necessary because we
allow the outcome and selection equations to have different covariates and non-zero (cross-equation)
correlation between unobserved effects. Further, note that (3.7b) does not impose any restrictions
on temporal dependence of us,it or in the relationship between us,it and it.
16See Wooldridge (1995) for details.
17Note that since xs,it contains unity, the tmax intercept parameters in ϕs are not identified.
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Specifically, we set
L [us,it |it ] = pis,tit , (3.10)
where parameter pis,t is allowed to be time-varying, thus emphasizing the presence of temporal
dynamics in the relationship between us,it and it. The assumption of the disturbance in the
outcome equation having a linear conditional mean is quite standard (e.g., Maddala, 1983, p.269).
A common alternative to Assumption 2(ii) is the assumption of bivariate normality of the two
disturbances a` la Heckman (1979) which also implies linearity of the conditional mean of us,it.
However, our assumption is less restrictive.
We are now ready to derive the selection bias corrected cost function. Taking the expectation
of Cs,it from (3.1a) conditional on the selection of the sth technology, we obtain
E
[
Cs,it
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , Tit = s] = x′s,itβs + E [αs,i ∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , Tit = s]+ E [us,it ∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , Tit = s]
= x′s,itβs + x
′
s,iϕs + w
t−1
i
′ωs,t + %s,tE
[
it
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , Tit = s]
= x′s,itβs + x
′
s,iϕs + w
t−1
i
′ωs,t + %s,tλs,it , (3.11)
where we have used (3.9) and (3.10) in the second equality. Here, %s,t ≡ pis,t + ψs,t and, given
normality of it under Assumption 1, λs,it is the first moment of the truncated normal distribution.
Our generalized model is consistently estimated via a two-stage procedure. For each time period
t, we first estimate the ordered probit via maximum likelihood as specified in (3.5)-(3.6). The
parameter estimates of the selection equation are then used to obtain consistent estimates of λs,it.
We then estimate the selection bias corrected cost function (3.11), in which predicted λ̂s,it are used
in place of λs,it, via pooled least squares for each technology s, separately.
In order to conduct inference across equations for different technology types s as well as to
account for the use of the predicted regressors λ̂s,it in the second stage, we follow Newey (1984)
and cast the model in a multiple-equation system GMM framework which permits derivation of an
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for our estimator. That is, by transforming the estimators
from the two stages into their sample moment condition equivalents, i.e.,
fN
(
θ̂
)
=

1∑
1{t=1}
∑
i
∂ logLi1(θ̂†,1)
∂θ̂
′
†,1
...
1∑
1{t=tmax}
∑
i
∂ logLitmax(θ̂†,tmax)
∂θ̂
′
†,tmax
1∑
1{Tit=1}
∑
i
∑
t h1,itv̂1,it
(
θ̂†, θ̂‡,1
)
...
1∑
1{Tit=S}
∑
i
∑
t hS,itv̂S,it
(
θ̂†, θ̂‡,S
)

, (3.12)
we can estimate the system-wide variance-covariance matrix by evaluating the (asymptotic) optimal
GMM variance at our two-stage parameter estimates∂fN
(
θ̂
)
∂
(
θ̂
) ′ [V̂{fN (θ̂)}]−1 ∂fN
(
θ̂
)
∂
(
θ̂
)

−1
. (3.13)
Here, θ̂ =
(
θ̂†, θ̂‡
)
is the system-wide parameter vector partitioned into vectors of the first and
second stage parameters. Lit is the likelihood function for the technology selection equation (3.5)
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for a credit union i in the time period t. hs,it and v̂s,it are a column vector of right-hand-side
covariates from the selection bias corrected cost function (3.11) and a corresponding least squares
residual for an s-type credit union i in the time period t, respectively. V̂ is a robust estimate of the
variance-covariance of the moment conditions.
The estimation procedure warrants a few remarks. First, given that the selection equation
includes lagged covariates, to estimate model (3.1) one needs to forgo the first wave of observations.
Second, the parameterization of unobserved effects ξi in the selection equation as a linear projection
on the time averages18 of wt−1i implies that w
t−1
i = w
t−1
i ≡ (Tit−1, zit−1) for t = 2, resulting in
perfect collinearity among right-hand-side variables in (3.5). Thus, when estimating our generalized
model, one can effectively use observations for t = 3, . . . , tmax only. Third, since the parameter
vector in (3.11) has both time-invariant and time-varying components, we suggest organizing the
data for each s and i as follows
E
 Cs,i3...
Cs,itmax
 =
 x
′
s,i3
...
x′s,itmax
βs +
x
′
s,i
...
x′s,i
ϕs +
w
2
i
′ 0 0
0
. . .
0 w
(tmax−1)
i
′

 ωs,3...
ωs,tmax
+
λs,i3 0 00 . . .
0 λs,itmax

 %s,3...
%s,tmax
 .
Note that the parameter vector ωs = (ωs,3, . . . ,ωs,tmax) is
(tmax+1)(tmax−2)
2 (L+ 1)× 1. In the case
of a large tmax, equation (3.11) is likely to suffer from severe multicollinearity due to the inclusion
of many wt−1i covariates. In such instances, we recommend restricting the elements of ωs,t to be
equal, i.e., setting ωs,t1 = · · · = ωs,t(t−1) in the notation used in (3.9). The latter implies that (3.11)
ought to include wt−1i in place of w
t−1
i . This is equivalent to assuming that unobserved effects
αs,i take a (time-varying) Mundlak-type form in the w dimension [as opposed to Chamberlain’s
specification used in Assumption 2(i)]. This restriction significantly decreases the dimension of ωs
to (tmax − 2)(L+ 1)× 1.19
4 Estimation and Results
In order to analyze the consequences of the failure to accommodate heterogeneity in technologies
resulting from endogenous selection as well as the presence of unobserved effects amongst credit
unions, we estimate several auxiliary models in addition to the one developed in Section 3. For the
ease of discussion, all the models we estimate are defined below.
Models Ignoring Unobserved Effects:
Model 1. The model of heterogeneous technologies with endogenous switching given by (3.1)
where αs,i = ξi = 0. The model is estimated in two stages using (3.5)-(3.6) and (3.11) as
described in Section 3, under the restriction ηt = ϕs = ωs,t = 0.
Model 2. The model of homogeneous technology. This model is the most widely estimated
in the literature by specifying two outputs instead of four in order to eliminate zero-value
observations. The two outputs are the linearly aggregated loans (y1 + y2 + y3) and investments
(y4). The model is estimated via pooled least squares using the whole sample ignoring a credit
union’s technology type.
18Or any other form of linear projection.
19We impose this restriction when estimating the model in Section 4.
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Models Controlling for Unobserved Effects:
Model 3. The generalized model of heterogeneous technologies with endogenous switching and
correlated effects given by (3.1) and estimated in two stages as described in Section 3. This is
our preferred model.
Model 4. The model of homogeneous technologies with two outputs and correlated effects.
The model is estimated via least squares using observations for credit unions of all technology
types. In order to facilitate direct comparability between the models, here we model unobserved
effects in the same fashion as in Model 3, i.e., by specifying the correlation between unobserved
effects and the right-hand-side covariates in the spirit of Assumption 2(i).20
All models but generalized Model 3 are misspecified. Further, note that Models 1 and 2 are special
cases of Models 3 and 4, respectively. The sole difference between the two sets of models is that
the correlated effects are assumed away in the first set (i.e., in Models 1 and 2). Comparing the
results across these two sets of models enables us to gauge the degree to which the returns to scale
estimates get distorted as a result of the model misspecification due to the ignored dependence
between unobserved effects and covariates in the regressions.
Similarly, we estimate Models 2 and 4 to investigate how results change if one does not recognize
technological heterogeneity among credit unions of different types. Both models are estimated
under the most widely used specification in the literature, which assumes a common technology
shared by all credit unions. Here, the misspecification stems from ignoring both the selectivity and
heterogeneity in technologies. We assess the magnitude of distortions by comparing the estimates
from Model 2 (4) with those from Model 1 (3).
For all models, we use the translog form21 of the dual cost function, onto which we impose the
symmetry and linear homogeneity (in input prices) restrictions. In the first stages of Models 1 and
3 (ordered probit), for the identification we suppress intercepts, normalize σt = 1 and set µ0,t = −∞
and µ3,t = ∞. All continuous z variables that enter the selection equation are logged to allow for
some degree of nonlinearity. To conserve space, we do not report the results from the first stage
(they are available upon request) and thus directly proceed to the discussion of the main results.22
[insert Table 4 here]
The left pane of Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the point estimates of returns to scale
based on all four models, over the 1996-2011 sample period.23 Here, we break down the results by
the technology type of credit unions. Note that although Models 1 and 3 estimate credit unions’ cost
functions for each technology separately, we also report the statistics for the whole distribution of
credit unions obtained by pooling the results (over technology types) after the estimation. Similarly,
we are able to break down the estimates of returns to scale from Models 2 and 4 by technology
types after fitting a single homogeneous cost function for all credit unions. The credit-union-specific
20An alternative would be to estimate Model 4 via the within estimator that assumes no form of correlation between
unobserved effects and covariates in the cost function (thus modeling these unobserved effects as “fixed effects”).
21While we emphasize the heterogeneity in credit unions’ production technologies due to their differing output mixes,
we acknowledge that ideally one would also prefer to allow the technology to be heterogeneous among credit unions
for a given output mix. In this paper, we assume such heterogeneity away, which is an undeniable limitation of
our analysis. One could extend our model to allow the cost function to be credit-union specific by, say, employing
semi- or nonparametric methods (although controlling for unobserved effects in that case may require a different
approach). Here, we opt for the parametric specification (translog) mainly for expository purposes as well as its
tractability. We leave the extension of our model to an even more general setup for future research.
22The signs of statistically significant parameter estimates and mean marginal effects on conditional probabilities from
the first-stage probit are all in line with the intuition.
23The results are for 1996-2011 as opposed to 1994-2011 because the first two waves of the panel are consumed by
lagged covariates and correlated effects in the technology selection equation as discussed in Section 3.
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estimates of returns to scale are obtained using the formula that takes into account the quasi-fixity
of equity capital (Caves et al., 1981)
RS =
1− ∂logC
∂log k˜∑
j
∂logC
∂log yj
, (4.1)
where yj ∈ ys are the outputs a credit union produces.
We first focus on the results from Models 1 and 2. The empirical evidence suggests that Model
2, which assumes a homogeneous production technology for all credit unions regardless of their
differing output mixes, tends to underestimate the returns to scale for credit unions of Technologies
1 and 3, whereas the results are quite indistinguishable for Technology 2. Figure 3 shows these
results by plotting kernel densities of the returns to scale estimates from all four models (for now,
ignore those of the estimates from Models 3 and 4). We attribute this differences to biases in the
estimates from Model 2 due to the ignored selection and parameter heterogeneity.
[insert Figure 3 here]
We formally test the presence of non-homogeneous credit union technologies via the multiple-
restriction Wald test of H0 : βs = βj for s = 1, 2, 3 (s 6= j) in Model 1. The test strongly
confirms the presence of heterogeneity in credit union cost structures: the p-value is less than
10−100. We also perform a test for the presence of endogenous switching, i.e., a joint Wald test of
H0 : %s,3 = · · · = %s,tmax = 0 for s = 1, 2, 3 in Model 1. The tests reject the null of no selection
bias with p-values less than 10−7 for all three technology groups, confirming that the switching is
not exogenous and hence not “ignorable”. The latter validates the proposition that the estimates
from Model 2 are subject to selection and misspecification (due to imposed parameter homogeneity)
biases.
The qualitative differences between the models are more transparent when credit unions are
grouped into three returns to scale categories: decreasing returns to scale (DRS), constant return
to scale (CRS) and increasing returns to scale (IRS). We classify a credit union as exhibiting
DRS/CRS/IRS if the point estimate of its returns to scale is found to be statistically less than/equal
to/greater than unity at the 95% significance level.24
Based on the results from Model 1 (see Table 4), we find that virtually all credit unions of
Technology 1 operate under IRS. We however cannot say the same with respect to credit unions
of the other two technology types. Here we find that 8.2% and 6.4% of credit-union-years under
Technology 2 and 3 exhibit non-IRS (i.e., DRS or CRS), respectively. Qualitatively, Models 1 and 2
produce similar results for credit unions operating under Technology 1 and 2. However, the biases
in estimates from Model 2 tell a rather different story for Technology 3. According to this model,
astounding 20.3% of credit unions operate under DRS and are thus scale-inefficient.
However, as mentioned above, Models 1 and 2 are misspecified and their results are likely to be
misleading because of endogeneity bias due to the ignored dependence between unobserved effects
and covariates in the regressions. We thus proceed to the models that explicitly control for correlated
effects: Models 3 and 4.25 Figure 3 plots the kernel densities of the returns to scale estimates from
these models (see Table 4 for the summary statistics of the estimates).
24We use the delta method to construct standard errors for the returns to scale estimates.
25Following equation (3.11), we parameterize correlated effects in cost functions as linear projections of (i) all contin-
uous variables included in the first-stage selection equation and (ii) all unique variables in the cost functions, except
for the time trend. Thus, we do not include squared and cross-product terms from the translog cost functions into
the set of variables onto which unobserved effects are assumed to project. Doing the latter would be redundant.
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The evidence suggests that the model which ignores endogenous switching and technological
heterogeneity (Model 4) tends to underestimate the returns to scale at which credit unions operate
across all three technology groups. The kernel densities of estimates from Model 3 are generally
shifted rightward compared to those of estimates from Model 4. Thus, the biases in returns to scale
estimates produced by Model 4 generally appear to be of negative sign.
We again reject the null of a homogeneous (common) cost function across different technology
groups. The p-value corresponding to the Wald test of H0 : βs = βj for s = 1, 2, 3 (s 6= j) on the
coefficients of (3.11) in Model 3 is less than 10−100. Similarly, the Wald tests of H0 : %s,3 = · · · =
%s,tmax = 0 for s = 1, 2, 3 performed on (3.11) again confirm the presence of selection bias in Model
4 (p-values are less than 10−4 for all three technology groups). Thus, the data favor our preferred
generalized Model 3.
Figure 3 also informs of the differences across Models 3 and 4, which account for credit union-
specific correlated effects, and Models 1 and 2, which ignore this unobserved heterogeneity. The
evidence indicates the presence of a negative bias in the returns to scales estimates obtained from
Models 1 and 2: the kernel densities from these models are to the left of those produced by the
corresponding models that control for unobserved effects. The biases appear to be the largest in
the case of Technology 3. The above emphasizes the importance of taking unobserved effects into
account when estimating credit union technologies.
[insert Figure 4 here]
Figure 4 depicts the 95% confidence intervals of the returns to scale estimates from generalized
Model 3, based on which the right pane of Table 4 is partly populated.26 These confidence intervals,
which correspond to each observation (credit-union-year) over the 1996-2011 period, are represented
by vertical line segments that are sorted by the lower bound. As expected, in contrast to Model 1,
which ignores unobserved effects, Model 3 predicts virtually zero credit unions with non-IRS across
all technology groups: virtually all confidence intervals lie above unity. In contrast, the results from
Model 4 of homogeneous technology still suggest that 6.3% of credit unions of the third technology
type exhibit non-IRS (see Table 4). The latter finding however is not as drastic as the one based
on Model 2, a correlated-effects-free counterpart of Model 4.
Although both Models 3 and 4 strongly support the evidence in favor of IRS almost universally
exhibited by credit unions operating under Technologies 1 and 2, the correspondence in rankings of
credit unions by these models is weak. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of the returns
to scale estimates from the two models is between 0.65 and 0.78. We attribute these differences to
selection and misspecification biases present in Model 4.
As briefly mentioned above, we find the least agreement in results across our generalized Model
3 and Model 4 in the case of Technology 3: the rank correlation coefficient is 0.21. While Model 4
indicates that 3.1% and 3.2% of credit unions in this technology group operate at DRS and CRS,
respectively, based on our preferred Model 3 we however find that virtually all of these credit unions
enjoy IRS. This finding is consistent with the results in Wheelock and Wilson (2011) who find no
evidence of DRS and CRS among credit unions in their sample either. It is worth pointing out that,
despite similarities between Wheelock and Wilson’s and our findings (based on generalized Model
3), the results are however not directly comparable. First, our sample periods differ: we consider
the period of 1994-2011, whereas Wheelock and Wilson (2011) examine the 1989-2006 period.27
Second, Wheelock and Wilson (2011) obtain their returns to scale estimates from an admittedly
more flexible nonparametric cost function whereas our estimation approach is parametric. Third,
26Similar figures for the other three models are available upon request.
27Unfortunately, we have no access to public data on credit unions that date back beyond 1994.
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they aggregate outputs in order to eliminate zero-value observations, and their cost function does
not include equity capital as one of the inputs. Fourth, Wheelock and Wilson (2011) do not explore
the possibility of endogeneity in a credit union’s choice of the output mix. Lastly, while controlling
for time effects, Wheelock and Wilson (2011) however left the issue of unobserved time-invariant
effects unaddressed. All of these issues undercut the comparability of Wheelock and Wilson’s (2011)
and our results.
[insert Figure 5 here]
We find that returns to scale in the credit union industry have increased over the course of years,
as can be seen in Figure 5. The phenomenon is observed for all technology types of credit unions.
However, we find unexpected results when analyzing the relationship between returns to scale of a
credit union and its size (proxied by total assets). Normally, one would expect to see an inverse
relationship between the two. We do confirm it when looking at the entire sample. However, as
Figure 6 shows, this result is not uniform across all technology groups. We find that the estimated
returns to scale (from our generalized Model 3) fall as one moves from small to larger credit unions
that operate under Technologies 1 and 2. However, the returns to scale increase with the size for
credit unions operating under Technology 3. For instance, the estimates of returns to scale from
Model 4 fall with the asset size regardless of the technology type (not reported to conserve space).
While this finding looks puzzling at the first glance, there is an intuitive explanation to it.
[insert Figure 6 here]
Recall that the asset size of the credit unions increases as one moves from Technology 1 to 3 (see
Table 3 and Figure 2). Thus, as credit unions grow and transition from the first technology type
to the second, a positive effect of scale on the cost naturally wears out. The relationship between
the size and returns to scale however breaks down for credit unions in the third technology group.
One can think of several reasons to explain this. First, an increase in available resources as credit
unions continue to grow enables them to adopt new information processing technologies that are
unaffordable to smaller, more financially constrained credit unions but are substantial cost-savers.
The example of such technologies would be internet banking, automated teller machines, use of
electronic money as well as an access to members’ credit history through the credit rating bureaus.
Second, larger credit unions enjoy greater diversification. On average, credit unions in this group
have a 32 (4) times larger number of members than those belonging to the first (second) technology
group. The diversification comes not only through a larger membership pool, but also through a
wider range of services provided to members as well as an opportunity to engage in more advanced
financial operations (Wilcox, 2005). The latter is partly due to economies of diversification enjoyed
by credit unions as they move from one technology to another (recall that technologies are ordered).
The data suggest the presence of non-negligible economies of scope, which is a matter of substantial
interest on its own. We leave the discussion of it for a future paper. Lastly, larger credit unions can
also protect their market positions by erecting entry barriers thus partly mitigating the decline in
returns to scale as they grow. Hughes and Mester (2013) report a similar finding for large banks.
5 Conclusion
A trillion dollar worth credit union industry takes up a significant portion of the U.S. financial
services market, catering to almost a hundred million people in the country. Given the dramatic
growth of the industry over the past few decades, there has been a substantial interest in formally
modeling the technologies of credit unions. However, the econometric approaches widely used in
the existing literature somewhat limit our understanding of the structure, dynamics and future
17
evolution of the credit union industry.
Faced by the presence of an overwhelming number of observations for which the reported values
of credit unions’ outputs are zeros, the existing studies of credit union technologies have mainly re-
sorted to the linear aggregation of different types of outputs into broader categories. This procedure
leads to a loss of valuable information in both econometric and economic senses.
In this paper, we show that the presence of zero-value observations is not merely a data issue but
a consequence of substantial time-persistent heterogeneity amongst credit unions’ technologies as
captured by differing output mixes. This heterogeneity is likely to be an outcome of an endogenous
choice made by credit unions. Models that a priori impose homogeneity and/or overlook credit
unions’ endogenous technology selection are likely to produce biased, inconsistent and misleading
estimates. The results are also likely to be biased due to unobserved effects which are widely ignored
in the credit union literature.
We address the above concerns by developing a unified framework that allows the estimation
of credit union technologies that is robust to (i) misspecification due to an a priori assumption of
homogeneous technology, (ii) selectivity bias due to ignoring the endogeneity in technology selection,
and (iii) endogeneity (omitted variable) bias due to a failure to account for unobserved union-specific
effects that are correlated with covariates in the estimated equations.
We develop a generalized model of endogenous switching with ordered choice and correlated
effects that allows treatment of predetermined variables in the selection equation by extending
Wooldridge’s (1995) estimator in the spirit of Arellano and Carrasco (2003). We note that our
model is not tailored to the analysis of credit unions only. The framework can be applied to
any other panel data study where selectivity and both observed and unobserved heterogeneity are
present. Some examples would be studies of electric or water utilities, which often include both
specialized and integrated companies that operate under non-homogeneous technologies.
We find that not all U.S. retail credit unions are alike. There is evidence of persistent techno-
logical heterogeneity among credit unions offering different financial service mixes. We consistently
fail to reject the null hypotheses of exogenous technology selection and homogeneous technology
among credit unions and generally find that ignoring this observed heterogeneity or ignoring unob-
served time-invariant effects across units leads to downward biases in returns to scale estimates. In
particular, models that do not account for parameter heterogeneity, endogenous switching and/or
dependence between unobserved effects and right-hand-side covariates can produce a misleading
finding that 6 to 20% of credit unions offering all types of loans suffer from diseconomies of scale
and are thus scale-inefficient. Employing our generalized model, we however find that credit unions
(of all technology types) show overwhelming evidence of substantial economies of scale. Hence, the
growth of the industry is far from reaching its peak.
18
Appendix
Table A.1: Call Report Definitions of the Variables
Variable NCUA Account Definition Description
y1 Acct 703 + Acct 386 Real estate loans: first mortgage real estate loans, other
real estate loans
y2 Acct 475 Commercial loans: business and agricultural loans
(MBLs) granted YTD
y3 Acct 025B – y1 – y2 Consumer loans: total loans, less real estate loans, less
commercial loans
y4 Acct 799 Total investments
y˜5 (Acct 380 + Acct 381)/
Acct 018
Average interest rate on saving deposits: dividends on
shares, interest on deposits, divided by total shares and
deposits
y˜6 (Acct 110 + Acct 131)/
Acct 025B
Average interest rate on loans: total (gross) interest and
fee income on loans, fee income, divided by total loan
and leases
w1 (Acct 230 + Acct 250 +
Acct 260 + Acct 270 +
Acct 280 + Acct 290 +
Acct 310 + Acct 320 +
Acct 360)/Acct 018
Price of capital: travel and conference expense, office oc-
cupancy expense, office operations expense, educational
and promotional expense, loan servicing expense, profes-
sional and outside services, member insurance, operating
fees (examination and/or supervision fees), miscellaneous
operating expenses, divided by total shares and deposits
w2 Acct 210/(Acct 564A +
0.5*Acct 564B)
Price of labor: employee compensation and benefits, di-
vided by full-time equivalent employees [Number of credit
union employees who are: Full-time (26 hours or more)
+ 0.5*Part-time (25 hours or less per week)]
k˜ Acct 931 + Acct 668 +
Acct 945 + Acct 658 +
Acct 940 + Acct 602
Equity: regular reserves, appropriation for non-
conforming investments, accumulated unrealized gains
(losses) on available-for-sale securities and other compre-
hensive income, other reserves, undivided earnings, net
income
C Acct 010 Total variable, non-interest cost: total non-interest ex-
penses
Total Assets Acct 010 Total assets
Leverage (Acct 860C + Aacct 820a +
Acct 825 + Acct 018)/
Acct 010
Total liabilities [total borrowing, accrued dividends and
interest payable on shares and deposits, accounts payable
and other liabilities, total shares and deposits], divided
by total assets
Reserves Acct 931 + Acct 668 Regular reserves, appropriation for non-conforming in-
vestments
Current Members # Acct 083 Total number of current members
Potential Members # Acct 084 Total number of potential members
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Zero-Value Observations, 1994-2011
Year y1 y2 y3 y4 Total Year y1 y2 y3 y4 Total
1994 3,670 9,063 0 3 9,783 2004 2,344 7,099 1 64 8,209
1995 3,517 9,056 0 0 9,734 2005 2,171 6,695 1 57 7,948
1996 3,555 9,162 0 2 9,891 2006 2,044 6,333 1 68 7,718
1997 3,441 9,059 0 0 9,765 2007 1,952 6,101 1 59 7,506
1998 3,269 8,811 0 0 9,561 2008 1,805 5,703 1 38 7,174
1999 3,140 8,650 0 55 9,426 2009 1,485 5,086 1 55 6,521
2000 2,925 8,442 0 75 9,195 2010 1,612 5,306 1 115 6,761
2001 2,764 8,114 0 61 8,932 2011 1,539 5,212 1 61 6,591
2002 2,601 7,739 0 61 8,611 Total 46,377 133,152 9 870 151,817
2003 2,543 7,521 1 96 8,491
NOTES: The variables are defined as follows: y1 - real estate loans, y2 - business and agricultural loans, y3 - consumer
loans, y4 - investments.
Table 2: Tabulation of All Possible Heterogeneous Technologies, 1994-2011
Technology Obs. Unique CUs Technology Obs. Unique CUs
Complete Specialization Three-Output Specialization
y1 5 1 y1, y2, y3 20 10
y2 0 0 y1, y2, y4 0 0
y3 673 328 y1, y3, y4 87,122 11,764
y4 0 0 y2, y3, y4 526 306
Two-Output Specialization No Specialization
y1, y2 0 0 y1, y2, y3, y4 18,118 4,466
y1, y3 171 113
y1, y4 4 1
y2, y3 1 1
y2, y4 0 0
y3, y4 45,177 9,446
NOTES: The variables are defined as follows: y1 - real estate loans, y2 - business and
agricultural loans, y3 - consumer loans, y4 - investments.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, 1994-2011
Variable Mean Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
Technology 1
Cost 171.8 0.7 47.6 101.2 205.3 9,866.0
y3 2,648.0 0.9 680.4 1,566.0 3,284.0 16,387.6
y4 1,547.0 0.0 167.9 580.3 1,635.0 262,500.0
y˜5 0.028 0.000 0.017 0.029 0.038 0.056
y˜6 0.100 0.000 0.082 0.095 0.110 0.993
w1 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.023 0.031 0.695
w2 32.9 0.0 20.1 32.2 43.3 266.3
k˜ 687.6 0.6 175.9 386.7 826.0 54,030.0
Total Assets 4,712.0 22.3 1,215.0 2,769.0 5721.0 373,600.0
Leverage 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.842
Reserves 198.8 0.0 47.6 100.2 214.0 18,270.0
Current Members # 1,127 27 401 745 1,378 43,560
Potential Members # 4,389 1 700 1461 3,000 10,000,000
Multiple-Bond CU 0.321
Federal CU 0.625
State CU (insured) 0.360
Technology 2
Cost 2,244.0 3.2 333.4 767.5 1,965.0 580,500.0
y1 15,780.0 0.0 675.0 2,850.0 10,290.0 6,501,000.0
y3 24,750.0 3.0 3,767.0 8,172.0 20,090.0 9,126,000.0
y4 18,290.0 0.0 1,683.0 4,859.0 13,300.0 4,620,000.0
y˜5 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.027 0.036 0.194
y˜6 0.091 0.000 0.079 0.089 0.100 0.973
w1 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.023 0.031 0.695
w2 46.6 0.0 37.8 45.2 54.1 6,187.0
k˜ 7,338.0 0.8 1,080.0 2,477.0 5,955.0 2,587,000.0
Total Assets 65,750.0 116.0 8,908.0 20,580.0 51,300.0 24,090,000.0
Leverage 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.351
Reserves 2,638.0 0.0 294.7 707.5 1,800.0 2,563,000.0
Current Members # 8,859 5 1,754 3,570 8,276 2,451,000
Potential Members # 72,790 1 3,500 9,000 32,430 27,000,000
Multiple-Bond CU 0.427
Federal CU 0.610
State CU (insured) 0.378
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, 1994-2011 (cont.)
Variable Mean Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
Technology 3
Cost 10,030.0 18.3 1,306.0 3,619.0 10,230.0 1,448,000.0
y1 119,400.0 1.0 8,314.0 29,230.0 94,810.0 18,940,000.0
y2 5,831.0 0.0 163.7 710.9 3,577.0 874,500.0
y3 98,490.0 13.0 10,260.0 29,440.0 84,190.0 14,340,000.0
y4 66,820.0 3.0 4,599.0 14,620.0 48,050.0 12,360,000.0
y˜5 0.02 0.000 0.015 0.023 0.033 0.067
y˜6 0.083 0.000 0.072 0.082 0.093 0.873
w1 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.023 0.031 0.695
w2 51.6 0.2 42.2 49.9 58.7 324.4
k˜ 32,970.0 10.0 3,902.0 10,250.0 29,870.0 5,079,000.0
Total Assets 326,400.0 224.0 35,860.0 98,320.0 288,600.0 46,930,000.0
Leverage 0.023 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.021 0.439
Reserves 11,880.0 0.0 1,106.0 2,956.0 8,159.0 4,906,000.0
Current Members # 32,070 119 4,972 12,570 33,070 3,867,000
Potential Members # 365,800 250 15,000 66,500 250,000 28,000,000
Multiple-Bond CU 0.307
Federal CU 0.523
State CU (insured) 0.457
NOTES: The variables are defined as follows. Cost - total variable, non-interest cost; y1 - real estate
loans, y2 - business and agricultural loans; y3 - consumer loans; y4 - investments; y˜5 - average saving
pricing; y˜6 - average loan pricing; w1 - price of capital; w2 - price of labor; k˜ - equity capital; Leverage
- the ratio of total debt to total assets; Multiple-Bond, Federal, and State (insured) CU - indicator
variables that take value of one if a CU is multiple-bond, federally accredited, or state-accredited (but
federally insured), respectively. The remaining variables are self-descriptive. Cost, y1, y2, y3, y4, w2,
k˜, Assets, Reserves are in thousands of real 2011 US dollars; y˜5, y˜6, w1, Leverage are interest rates
and thus are unit-free. The numbers of Current and Potential Members are in terms of number of
people. Despite that minima of several variables are reported to be zeros (due to rounding), they are
not exactly equal to zeros.
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Table 4: Summary of Returns to Scale Estimates
Model
Point Estimates of RS Categories of RS, %
Mean St. Dev. Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max DRS CRS IRS
Technology 1
(1) 1.232 0.139 0.808 1.144 1.211 1.293 2.486 0.5 1.1 98.3
(2) 1.162 0.075 0.890 1.113 1.150 1.198 2.003 0.1 0.3 99.6
(3) 1.551 0.345 0.849 1.277 1.464 1.760 2.502 0.0 0.2 99.8
(4) 1.232 0.082 0.934 1.176 1.222 1.278 2.226 0.0 0.0 100.0
Technology 2
(1) 1.085 0.060 0.875 1.043 1.081 1.121 1.805 4.5 3.7 91.8
(2) 1.085 0.065 0.878 1.040 1.078 1.120 2.162 5.0 2.6 92.4
(3) 1.374 0.259 0.914 1.168 1.317 1.536 2.499 0.4 0.5 99.1
(4) 1.149 0.087 0.922 1.089 1.137 1.193 2.189 0.6 0.7 98.6
Technology 3
(1) 1.063 0.050 0.863 1.038 1.058 1.079 1.822 0.3 6.0 93.6
(2) 1.038 0.057 0.889 1.001 1.028 1.063 1.703 20.3 7.6 72.1
(3) 1.267 0.124 0.990 1.176 1.273 1.353 2.352 0.0 0.1 99.9
(4) 1.089 0.071 0.914 1.042 1.077 1.120 2.296 3.1 3.2 93.7
Whole Sample
(1) 1.124 0.112 0.808 1.052 1.096 1.163 2.486 2.9 3.3 93.9
(2) 1.100 0.079 0.878 1.044 1.092 1.144 2.162 5.6 2.6 91.7
(3) 1.406 0.288 0.849 1.194 1.336 1.555 2.502 0.3 0.4 99.4
(4) 1.163 0.096 0.914 1.094 1.152 1.218 2.296 0.8 0.9 98.3
NOTE: Percentage points may not sum up to a hundred due to rounding.
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Figure 1: Tabulation of Credit Unions by Technology Type
Figure 2: Kernel Densities of (log) Total Assets
Tabulated by Technology Type, 1994-2011
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Figure 3: Kernel Densities of Returns to Scale Estimates
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Figure 4: The 95% Confidence Intervals of Returns to Scale Estimates from Generalized Model 3
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Figure 5: Returns to Scale over Time; Estimates from Generalized Model 3
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Figure 6: Returns to Scale by (log) Total Assets Quintiles; Estimates from Generalized Model 3
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